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Just as deathand taxes arecertainties in this world, so are ways and
meansto minimize if not eliminatealtogether one's tax liabilities.Attempts
to escape the tax net may take any one of two forms: tax evasion and tax
avoidance. Tax evasion may be defined as the act of reducing taxes by
illegal or fraudulent means.1Common practices of tax evasion include:
under-reporting of income, over-statement of expenses, use of fictitious
receipts, the keeping of double sets of books, false or fictitious entries in
books, fictitious transactions in the name of dummies, non-recording of
sales, and others.Tax avoidance,onthe other hand, involvesthe legal re-
arrangements ofone's economic activitiesin order to lowerthe tax liability.
This isdone bymovingcapital or laborto areas, geographicalor otherwise,
wheretaxratesarelowerand/orbymanipulatingthetax parametersthrough
the legal means to spread or defer the tax liability over time thereby
effectively reducing the tax rate. Tax evasion is done by a taxpayer either
singlyor incollusionwith sometaxcollectionfunctionary,whiletaxavoidance
is done singly or with the help of some tax expert like a lawyer and an
accountant. As such, evasionand avoidance are interdependentactivities.
Significantand well-known tax avoidancecould induce increasedevasion.
Onthe partof the individual taxpayer,evasioncan substitute for avoidance
when increasingthecostoftaxavoidance mayincreasetaxevasion.Butthe
impactonthe economy ofboth are the same: lossof government revenue,
increase intaxpayer's after-tax income,and perverse effects onthe equity
and efficiency goals of the tax system.
From the administrative and policy perspective, determining the
magnitude of tax evasion and an analysis of tax evasion levels are
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1. Philippine tax jurisprudence has no general definition of the term "tax fraud."
However, the Bureauof Internal Revenue (BIR) Handbookfor Special Agents defines fraud
as "deception brought about by misrepresentationof material facts, and silencewhen good
faith requiresexpression, resulting in materialdamage toone who relieson the sameand has
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imperative,particularly if undertakenina disaggregativefashion wherethe
type oftax evaded aswell asthe group of taxpayerswith high propensityto
evade are identified. This exercisewill be useful in evaluating the success
orfailureoftheenforcement mechanism. Itmayindicatetothe policy-maker
the manner by which tax evasion impairs the distributional quality of the
tax system, skew the allocation of resources towards less productive
activities in the economy, decrease tax revenue and, consequently,
undermine fiscal and monetary policy.
Review of Literature
Tax non-compliance has been studied extensively in recent years.
Two aspects ofthis phenomenonhad received focus: (a)ananalysis ofthe
factors behindtax evasion activities, and (b)the measurement of revenue
loss resulting from tax non-compliance.
The seminar paper of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) presented a
theoretical economic analysis of tax evasion. The taxpayer is viewed as
choosingthe level of declared income, X, so asto maximize his expected
utility, U.2The expression for expected utility is:
E(U)--(1--p) U(W-tX) + p U[W-tX-r (W-X)] (1)
wherep isthe probabilityofthe authoritiesdetectingtax evasion,Wis actual
income,t isthe tax rateand r is the penalty rate.
This modelimpliesthat thetaxpayer will evadetaxes by declaring less
than his actual income, if expected tax paymenton unreported income is
lessthan the regulartax rate.The incorporationof non-pecuniaryfactors in
the taxpayers decision function, e.g., value of one's reputation, would
reduce the scope for "profitable" tax evasion. The analysis also suggests
thatthe levelof evasionisdependentonthe probability ofdetection andthe
penalties imposed on detected evaders. The higher the probability of
detection,the lowerwill bethe levelofevasion. Thehigherthe penalty rate,
the higher the amount of declared income. The model, however, yields
ambiguous results regardingthe impact of changing the values of the tax
rateandactual incomeonthe levelofevasion.The resultswoulddepend on
whether absolute risk aversion is decreasing, constant, or increasing.
Srinivasan (1974) showed that if the probability of detection is an
increasing function of the actual income, then the degree of evasion
decreases as income increases. But if the probability of detection is
independent of income,then evasion is positively related to the level of
income.Onthe otherhand,Yitzhaki(19"74) pointedoutthat ifthepenaltyrate
• 2. Alternatively, the taxpayer may be viewed as minimizing expected taxes and
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is a fine leviedon the amountof tax evaded,thenthe levelof declared
incomeunambiguously increaseswiththe tax rate.
Spicer (1986) enriched further the works of earlier writers by
incorporating theimpactofsocialnormssupportive oftaxcompliance inthe
economicmodeloftaxevasion.He achievedthisbyintroducing thepsychic
costof evasionin the taxpayer'sobjectivefunction.Psychiccostswere
postulatedto depend on the evasionbehaviorof other taxpayers,the
perceivedequityofthetaxsystem,informalsanctions, attitudetowardsrisk,




It also indicates that the incidence of evasion increases as the tax rate
increases.
The resultsof the formaleconomic analysisof Allingham,Sandmo,
and othersare consistentwith the empiricalevidencebased on survey
studies that the fear of sanctionsdeter evasion and that increased
opportunities forevasion(intheformofhigherincomes orgreaterproportion
of non-laborincome,and others,increasethe incidenceof evasion(Ma-
sonand Calvin1984,Clotfelter1983). Butwhileeconomicanalysisyields
an indeterminesignforthe impactof highertax ratesonevasion,empiri-
cal studiesprovideevidenceof a positiverelationship betweenthesetwo
variables(Clotfelter1983; Friedland,Maital,and Rutenberg1978). The
impliedpolicyprescriptionof these variousstudiesis obvious:find the
appropriatemix of enforcementactivitiesand penalties subjectto the
financialconstraints(costs/budget onthe levelofenforcementactivities).
Quiteindependent of theseinvestigations onthe determinantsoftax
evasion, themeasurement oftheimpact oftaxnon-compliance ongovernment
revenueshasalsoreceivedconsiderableattention.
UsingArgentiniandata, Herschel(1978) illustrated the application in
developing countriesofvarioustechniques ofmeasuring taxevasion.Tanzi
(1982) estimatedthesizeoftheunderground economyintheUnitedStates
and its implications on tax evasion.Richupan(1984), and Peacockand
Shaw (1982) providedexcellentcritiquesof the variousapproachesto
quantifytax evasion.
The NationalTaxResearchCenter(NTRC1986) madean attemptto
estimatetax evasioninthe Philippines for the year 1984.Theirestimated
amountoftaxevadedrangefrom1="3.9 billion to'P'l1.4billion.Thiswideband
indeedreflectsthemanydifficulties entailedinquantifying tax evasion.The
discussion inthefollowingparagraphs willhighlight theseproblems. Moreover,
the databaseandthe estimation procedures usedby NTRC requiresome
refinement,particularly inthefollowing: theuseofthe Departmentof Labor





There are several approachesto measure tax evasion:the gap
approach, tax elasticityapproach, special amnesties approach, audit
approach,andundergroundeconomyapproach.
Gap Approach
Inthegapapproach, whichistypically appliedtothe individual income
taxinearlierstudies,aggregatepersonalincomereportedinthetax returns
(ITR) iscomparedwithpersonalincomederivedfromthe nationalincome
accounts(NIA). Thedifference inthesetwoestimatesof personalincome
is presumed to be the income evaded for tax purposes.But for the
comparisonto be meaningful,adjustmentsto accountfor the conceptual
differencesinITRandNIAdefinitions ofpersonalincomehavetobemade.





excise, imports,exports, and other corporateincometaxes. The major
difficulty withthisapproachisthe scarcity ofavailabledataoncapitalgains,
imputedrentswhichareapre-requisite beforenecessaryadjustments can
be made.Butwheretheseinformation areavailable,the gap approachis
deemedsuperiortothe otherprocedures discussedbelow.
Elasticity Approach
Intheelasticity approach, thepotential taxrevenueisestimatedbased
on some average tax function in which tax collectionis regressed
econometrically onvariousdeterminantsliketax base and discretionary
changesintax structure.The typicalregression equationused is:
InT= a + bIn Y (2)
where T istax revenue and Y isthe tax base. The difference between
projected taxrevenuederivedfrom(2)andactualtaxrevenuemaybeused
as a measureof tax evasion.This approachassumesthat there is no
significant changeinthecomposition oftheGNPorthetaxbase.Witheither
a tax rateincreaseora changeincomposition of tax basethatwarrantsan
increase in taxes, this techniquetends to underestimatetax evasion.MANASAN: TAX EVASION 171
Richupan (1984) asserts that this procedure does not measure total tax
evasionbut itdoes provideagoodestimateofadditionaltax evasionand the
deteriorationoftaxadministration,valued intermsofthe estimation period's
mean level.
Special Amnesties Audit Approach
In contrast with the two techniques above, the special amnesties
approachmeasurestaxevasionusinginformationderivedfromtaxamnesties
returnsthat arevoluntarilysupplied bythe taxpayers. Inthe Philippines,as
inothercountries, specialtax amnesties havebeenoffered morethan once
in recent history.Taxpayers are inducedto declare their actual incomesin
exchange for withdrawal of their liability to fines and penalties. It is thus
• possibleto measuretax evasionusing data from these special amnesties.
However,this procedure measures onlypart of the taxes evaded because
sometaxpayers preferto makelimiteduse, if atall,oftheseamnesties;their
reasonsarevaried:they preferto remainoutsidethe taxnet,they arewaiting




The weakness of this technique stems from the fact that the revenue
agency's audit capability is usually limited and from the possibility that
corruption inthe ranksoftax enforcersusuallyleadtolower estimates oftax
evasion.
UndergroundEconomy Approach
The underground economy approach employs estimates of the so-
called parallel economy to arrive ata quantification of the amount of taxes
evaded.There arevariousways of measuringthe size of the underground
economy: the currency equation procedure, the physical input technique,
and the labor market approach.
Currencyequationprocedure. This procedure(Tanzi 1982)assumes
that underground activities are the direct result of high taxes and that
underground transactions are carried out mainly with the use of cash. It
startswiththe estimationofademandfor currencyequationthatpermitsone
to determine the effect oftax changes on that demand. Thus:
In C/M = a + b InT +c In W/Y +d In r+ e Iny (3)
where C iscurrency holding,M ismoneysupply, T is incometax rate, W/Y
is the ratin of wages and salaries to GNP, r is the rate of interest on time
deposits and y is the real per capita income.172 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Based on equation (3), two estimates of currency holding are
made, one when the tax variable is assumed to be zero the other when
it is not. The difference between these two is called "illegal money" while
the difference between M and "illegal money" refers to "legal money."
The size of the parallel economy isobtained by multiplying illegal money
by the velocity of legal money (which.is equal to GNP divided by legal
money). Finally, the amount of tax evasion is computed by applying the
average tax rate to the size of theunderground economy. Tanzi (1982)' --
asserts that this approach underestimates.tax evasion because it consid-
ers only evasion associated with both currency use and the undergroun
economy, it does not include evasion arising from the claiming of
exaggerated deductions, for instance. Similarly, it does not take into
account income from illegal activities.
Physicalinput technique.This assumesa stable relationshipbetween
somephysicalinputintheproductionprocessandnationaloutputabstracting
from changes in technology and output composition. This relationship is
then used to estimate GNP. The difference between this figure and the
officialestimateof GNPisattributedtothe blackeconomy.Guptaand Mehta
(1982) applied this procedure to India assuming a stable relationship
between electric power and GNP.The difficultyassociated with identifying
aninput which hasa stable relationshipwith GNP stands asthe drawback
of this technique.
Labor market approach. The approach estimates the size of the
parallel economy on the basis of unrel_ortedemployment figures and the
averageproductivity of labor (Contins i981). The major difficulty with this
technique stems from the reliability of .the estimate of unaccounted
unemployment aswell as that of labor productivity.
Allthree variants.ofthe undergroundeconomy approach share some
common shortcomings when used to estimate tax evasion: a) they involve
some overestimation in that they include income legally not subject totax,
and b) they also involve some underestimation by excluding unreported
incomefrom "aboveground".activities.
Giventhe numerouspitfallsin determining the degreeof taxevasion,
it is essential,to use different approaches instead of concentrating on a
simple procedureso that one gets a rangeof estimates ratherthan a point
estimate. Despitethese shortcomings,however,we re-emphasizethe need
to present these indicators no matter how tentative the results.
Estimatesof Tax Evasion
Individual Income Tax
Inthis study,threeofthefive alternativetechniquesthat arecommonly .I
used in quantifying tax evasion were applied to the individual income tax,




The potentialtax isthencomparedwiththe actualtaxyieldto arriveatthe
levelof taxevasion.
Assuch,aggregatepersonal income(alsoreferredtoasi'compensatio;i
of employeesand entrepreneurshipandpropertyincomeof persons")as
reported in the NationalIncomeAccounts(NIA) serves as the basis for
computingthe potentialtaxablebase. It is adjustedby subtracting,first,
itemsthatareincluded inthenational accounts definition ofpersonalincome
but donotactuallyaccruetothe householdsectorand,second,itemsthat
are not taxablegiventhe individualincometax statutes. The formerlist
includestheemployersshareofsocialsecuritycontribution andtheincome
of private,non-profit enterprises. The latterlistincludesdividends,interest
receipts,and imputedrentof owner-occupied dwellingunits.Time series
data on these excludeditemsare notreadilya_,ailable.The employer's
shareofsocialsecuritycontributions isapproximated bytakinghalf of the
total socialsecuritycontribution figuresprovideed in the NIA.
Incomeof private,non-profit enterprisesfor 1985 was estimatedas
equaltoone-halfo1thedifferencebetweenNIA aggregatepersonalincome
andthe 1985FamilyIncomeandExpenditure Survey(FIES)totalhousehold
income,exclusiveofgiftsandsocialsecurity benefits.3 The levelof private,
non-profit enterprise income thus derived.for 1985 was expressed as a
proportionofthe NIA personalincome.The resultingratiowas then used to '
estimate the levelsof _ncomeof private, non-profitenterprises in the other
years. The 1985 FIES also provided estimates of dividends, interest
.receipts,and imputed rents accruing to households. Again, these were
expressed as a proportion of NIA persOnalincome and the results were
employedtogenerateestimatesofdividends,interest.receipts,andimputed
rents in the other years.
Adjustedgrosspersonalincomefor the years 1981-1985was derived
by subtracting estimates of the five above-mentioned items,from the NIA
aggregatepersonal income.After makingfurther adjustmentsfor personal
exemptionsandallowabledeductions,themeasuregaveresultscomparable
tothe legallytaxable personalincome.Thedistributionofincomeby income
class, by size of household, and by type of income (compensation vs.
business income) basedon the 1985FIESwas appliedto the estimates of
adjusted gross personal income to obtain estimates of personal and
additional exemptions, andcompensationand business incomes.Potential
taxdue oncompensationincomewas derivedby multiplyingadjustedgross
compensationincome-lesspersonalexemptionsbystatutorymodifiedgross
3_ The differencebetv_;een theNIAand FIESestimatesofpersonalincomeisattributed
byexpertstoacombination of:a) statisticaldiscrepancy arisingprimarilyfromunder-reporting
of household incomeintheFIES, andb)incomeof private,non-profitenterprises, We decided
toarbitarily allocatethisdifferenceequallytothesetwoite_m, s.174 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
income tax (MGIT) rates. Potential tax revenue trom business income was.
similarly derived by applying statutory business income tax rates to adjusted
gross business income less personal exemptions and allowable deductions.
The levels of allowable business deduction were computed based on the
average deductions to gross income ratios derived by the NTRCfrom a
sample of 23,665 income tax returns of individuals engaged in business or
trade (NTRC 1987).4
The resulting estimates of levels of evasion of individual income tax in
1981-1985 totalled=P'17.3 billion (Table 1), The figures represented 44.7
percent of the potential tax from this source. In other words, only 55.3
percent of potential tax revenue were actually collected by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR). The results also showed evidence of a dramatic
reduction in tax evasion in 1982 with the introduction of the modified gross
income tax system in tha! year. However, the amount of evaded taxes shot
up once more in the succeeding years reflecting perhaps the ingeniousness
of taxpayers in finding new ways to evade taxes.
Table 1.
GAPAPPROACH ESTIMATESOF INDIVIDUAL INCOME
EVASION, 1981-1985
(In=Pmillion)
Year Potential Actual Tax Evaded Taxes
Tax Yield Collection_
1981 8185 3604 4581
1982 3935 3878 57
1983 4768 3869 899
1984 10826 4476 6350
1985 11015 5594 5421
TOTAL 38729 21421 17308
a/Based on NTRC data.
Tax audit approach. Under the audit approach, actual income tax
revenue is multiplied by an adjustment factor that accounts for deficiencytax
collected through tax audit to arrive at the amount of evaded taxes. For the
above given data, the BIR assessed the ratio ofdeficiency corporate income
tax collected after tax audit to the amount of taxes paid before tax audit to
4. iheprocedure described abovewasusedfor1982-1985. For1981,whena global
incometaxsystemwasstillinforce,thepotential taxwascomputed byapplyingeffectivetax
rates(fromtheBIR1983study)toadjusted grossincome.MANASAN: TAXEVASION 175
be .4121 in 1984 (NTRC 1987). Based on this, the adjustment factor
employed in the study was .4121 for the high estimate and .2060 for the low
estimate, s
In using the average tax audit ratio, we implicitly assumed that both the
tax effort and the tax evasion rate in the year the tax audit ratio was derived
were representative of those of the other years. Furthermore, while it might
be argued that actual tax collection already takes the audit adjustment into
account, we tended to view the audit ratio reported bythe BIR as understated
due to the fact that not all delinquent taxpayers were caught and due to
the collusion between the investigated taxpayers and some BIR exam_
iners,s
The caveats raised above should be borne inmind when one assesses
the tax evasion estimates based on tax audit approach presented in Table
2. Estimated income tax evasion based on the tax audit ratio ranged from
P'4.4 billionto=1_8.8 billionin 1981-1985. These constituted 17-29 percent of
potential tax. The estimates are considerably lower than gap approach
estimates and do notmirror thetrend observed when thegap procedui'e was
used.
Table 2
TAX AUDIT APPROACH ESTIMATESOF INDIVIDUAL
TAX EVASION, 1981-1985
(In_rnillion)
PotentialTax Yield Evaded Taxes
Actual Tax High Low High Low
Year Collection" Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
•1981 3604 5089 4346 1485 742
1982 3878 5476 4677 1598 799
1983 3869 5463 4666 1594 797
1984 4476 6321 5398 1845 923
1985 5594 7899 6746 2305 1152
TOTAL 21421 30248 25833 8827 4413
_'Based on NTRC data.
Tax elasticity approach. Following the elasticity approach, an average
individual income tax function was estimated based on the dummy variable
5. Therewasnoavailable estimate fortheindividual income taxsoweutilized theratio
forcorporate income tax.Also,itwouldhavebeenidealifadjustment ratiosspecific todifferent
i. incomeclasseswere usedgiventhataveragedeductionratioshavebeen observedto
increase withincome.Again,no suchinformation wasavailable.
6. Anecdotal storiestothiseffectabound.Thegoodnumberof individuals whotook
advantage ofthetaxamnestyin 1986substantiate theseclaims.
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technique. 7 Alternative specifications were regressed, but the best equation
was:
In liT = -13.56 + 1.81 In DPY + 8.27 D80 - 0.72 D80* In DPY (4)
(-3.46) (5.40) (1.86) (-1.92)
R_ = .96. D.W. = 1.81 RMSE% = .129 1975 - 1986
where the numbers in parenthesis are the t-statistics, liT is individual
income tax revenue inclusive of tax on passive income, 8 DPY isdisposable
personal income, (i.e. current personal receipts less direct taxes and social
security contributions) and D80 = 0 for 1975-1979 and 1 for 1980-1986. _
Equation (4) was then used to project potential tax yield for 1981-1985
(Table 3).
The difference between potential tax revenue and actual collections is
a measu re ofadditional tax evasion and the deterioration in tax administration
relative to average level in the estimation period. The mean level of evasion
for the period is high as suggested by our gap approach estimates. The
estimates indicate that incremental evasion was negative in 1981 and 1985
while it was positive but lost in 1982. In 1983 and 1984, there was a surge
in evasion consistent with our gap approach estimates. The estimated
decline in evasion levels in 1985, on the other hand, may simply reflect the
tendency of the elasticity approach to under-state tax evasion towards the
latter part of the estimation period due to bracket creep.
Table 3
ELASTICITYAPPROACH ESTIMATESOF INCREMENTAL INDIVIDUAL TAX
AND PASSIVE INCOME TAX EVASION, 1981-1985
(In_Pmillion)
Actual Projected Incremental
Year Collection ' Revenue Evasion
1981 3993 3599 - 107
1982 4064 4048 55
1983 5508 4631 566
1984 9214 7146 1637
1985 9678 • 8135 - 2627
•/ Based on NTRC data.
7. There are three ways of estimating the elasticity, namely: a) constant rate structure
method; b) proportional adjustment method; and c) dummy variable method. Manasan (1987)
used the two latter procedures with the Department of Finance tax series and came up with
consistent results. The former technique was not used for lack of data.
8. Our'tax variable in equation 4 includes both the individual income tax and taxes on
passive income because from 1975-1980 these two taxes were collected jointly.
9. A dummy variable to represent the introduction of final withholding tax on passive
income in 1980 was included in the equation.MANASAN:TAX EVASION 177
Taxes on Passive Income
The gap approach was applied to appraise the tax evasion level on
pasSive-income, i.e., taxes on dividends and interests. Dividends are
estimated as equal to 10 percent of after-tax income of corporations, lo
Data on corporateincometax after tax and dividendswere obtained from the
NIA. Dividends received by households came from the section on
individual income tax while dividends received by corporations were
derived as residual. Applying the legal tax rates of 15 and 10 percent,
respectively, on these figures, potential tax revenue was arrived at.
Evasion of tax on dividend in 1981-1985 was calculated to be t_11
million or 85 percent of potential revenue (Table 4).
Table 4
EVASIONOF TAX ON DIVIDENDS, 1981-1985
(Int_million)
Year Potential Tax ActualTax ° Evasion
1981 189 9 180
1982 177 11 166
1983 197 18 179
1984 181 27 154
1985 83 51 32
TOTAL 827 116 711
" Based on NTRC data.
On the other hand, data on interest expense of the banking system
(i.e., interest income of households and the business sector) came from the
Factbook of the Philippine Financial System. Interest on deposit substitutes
of non-banks was derived by multiplying deposit levels by the average
interest rate for the year. These interest figures were then multiplied
respectively, by .175, the average tax rate on interest on savings and time
deposits and .2, the tax rate on interest on deposit substitute to get potential
tax revenue. Evasion of tax on interest totalled1='18.5 billion in 1981-1985
(Table 5). This represents 78.9 percent of potential tax. A higher compliance
rate (52 percent) is observable in 1985. This may be attributed to the
elimination of the tax exemption of interest income ofP'1,000/annum starting
in 1984.




Year Potential Tax Actual Tax = Evasion
1981 2758 93 2665
1982 3992 104 3888 '
1983 4494 177 4317
1984 5428 1004 4424
1985 6803 3569 3234
TOTAL 23475 4947 18528
_ Based on NTRC data,
Theveryhighlevelsoftaxevasiononpassiveincome,despitethefact
thatthesetaxesarefinalandwithheldatsource,suggestthatthelegislation
aswellas the implementing regulationsarenotfool-proof.
Corporate/ncome Tax
Thegaptaxauditandthe elasticityapproacheswereusedtoassess
the levelof corporateincometax evasion.
Gap approach. While NIA estimateof corporateincomeisthe first
candidatethat comesto mindwhensearchingfora measureof corporate
incometaxbasethat isindependentofthatfoundinthe incometaxreturns
(ITR), closerexamination of NIAestimation methodology, revealsthatNIA
figuresare in fact sourcedfrom ITR data. The Securitiesand Exchange
Commission(SEC), however,has informationon the numberof active
registeredstockcorporations.while the.BIR has data on the numberof
corporateincome tax fliers. TheNTRC (1986) computedthecompliance
ratioto rangefrom .31 to .40 in 1981-1984.
The presentstudyevaluatedcorporate incometax evasionfirstby




methodology,the evasion levelfor 1981-1985 reached P11.6 billionor
27.9 percentof tax potential(Table 6). We shouldemphasizethat the
procedure used assumes that the distributionof tax burdensof those
whofiled taxreturnsis identical to thatof non-fliers.MANASAN: TAXEVASION• 179
Table 6
GAP APPROACHES ESTIMATES OFCORPORATE INCOME
TAX EVASION, 1981-1985
(IntPmillion)
• Year Potential Tax Actual Tax" Tax Evaded
1981 5117.4 3939 1178.4
1982 5625.6 4503 1122.6
1983 6029.2 4799 1230.2
1984 13311.5 8208 5103.5
1985 11406.6 8441 2965.6
TOTAL 41490.3 29890 11600.3
=_ Basedon NTRC data.
Tax Audit Approach. The procedure followed here is analogous to that
discussed under the section on Individual Income Tax (Tax audit ap-
proach). The adjustment factors used are .4121 and .2060 (based on the
average rate of increase in actual tax collected through the deficiency
audit of the BIR) for the high and the low estimate, respectively, of
potential corporate income tax. The projected levels of evasion ranged
fromt_6.1 billion to1_'12.3 billion in 1981-1987 (Table 7). As a proportion
of tax potential, these figures vary from .17 to .29.
Table 7
TAX AUDIT APPROACH ESTIMATES OF CORPORATE
TAX EVASION, 1981-1985
(in_P=million)
Potential Tax Yield Evaded Taxes
Actual Tax, High Low High Low
Year Collected° Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
• 1981 3939 5562.3 4750.4 1623.3 811.4
1982 4503 6358.7 5430.6 1855.7 927.6
1983 4799 6776.7 5787.6 1977.7 988.6
1984 8208 11590.5 9898.8 3382.5 1690.8
1985 8441 11919.5 10179.8 3478.5 1738.8
TOTAL 29890 42207.7 36047.2 12317.7 6157.2
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Elasticity Approach. As indicated by the elasticity approach, the
followingequationwas usedto projecttax revenues:
In CIT =6.65 + .10 GVANA- 13.16 D80 + 1.10 D80* In GVANA (5)
(1.94) (-7.03) (7.34)
R2 = .97 D.W. = 1.16 1975-1986
where the numbersinparenthesesare the t-statistics,CIT is corporate
incometax,GVANA isgrossvalueadded in non-agricultural sectorsand
D80 is 0 for 1975-1979 and 1 for i980-1986. This was the equationthat
exhibitedthe bestfit amongvariousspecifications thatwere investigated.
As have been pointedout, the elasticityapproachmeasures the
incremental evasionratherthanthelevelof evasion, Additional evasionwas









Year Potential Tax ActualTax= TaxEvaded
1981 4064. 3939 125
1982 4579 4503 75
1983 5342 4799 543
1984 7441 8208 - 767
1985 8468 8841 27
•_BasedonNTRCdata.
Sales Tax.Usingthe gapapproach,the potentialsalestax base was
assessedonthe basisofthe NIAdataonmerchandiseexportsandgross
valueadded(GVA)in manufacturing by industry group.First,grossvalue
added in manufactures of tobacco; petroleum and coal; alcoholic
beverages;" and crude coconut,vegetable and animal oils, rice/corn
milling andsugarmilling 12 wassubtracted fromthetotalmanufacturing GVA
11.Grossvalueaddedin th_manufactureofalcoholicbeverageswasassumedtobe
.544 of GVA in manufactureof all beveragesbasedon 1983 Input-Output data.
12.Crudecoconut, vegetableandanimaloils,rico/cornmillingandsugarmillingare all
assumedtoaccountfor .38 of GVA inallfoodmanufactures.Thisratioisbasedon thefiner
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becausetheaforementionedcommoditiesaresubject toeithera specific tax
or miller'stax,andarethusexemptedfromsalestax. Second, grossvalue
addedof manufacturedmerchandise exports was alsodeductedfromtotal
manufacturingGVA. GVA of manufacturedexports was obtained by
multiplying by .31 the differencebetweenFOBvalueoftotalmerchandise
exportsandthesumoftheFOBvalueofexportsofcrudecoconutoil,copper
concentrates,centrifugalsugar,gold,banana,desiccatedcoconut,copra
oil, cake and meal, coffee, shrimps,prawns, and logs.This ratiois the
averageGVAtooutputratioinmanufacturing, basedonthe1983I-O Table.
Third,totalmanufacturing GVA is furtherreducedby GVA in tax-exempt
manufactured products ofpioneerenterprisesregisteredwiththe Boardof
Investments (BOI)andtheNationalCottageIndustry Development Authority
(NACIDA)whichwas assumedto be equalto 10 percentoftotalGVA in
manufacturing. 1-_Fourth;an estimateofthe statutorysalestax basewas
derivedbyaddingsuppliesandotherintermediateinputsforwhichnotax
creditmaybeclaimedtotheadjustedmanufacturing GVAobtainedafterthe
firstthreeadjustments wereundertaken.The 1983I-O coefficients suggest
thatthesenon-deductible suppliesand intermediate inputsaccountfor 10
percentof manufactured output,29 percentof manufacturing GVA onthe
average.Thesalestaxpotential wasthenderivedbymultiplying thetaxable
baseby .1,the weightedaveragesalestaxrate.
The evasionofthe salestax amountedto1_21.6billionin 1981-1985
(Table9). Thisisequalto63.1 percentoftaxpotential.The evidencefrom
Table9 indicatesthat the evasionrate rosefrom59 to 68 percentin the
period.
Table9
GAPAPPROACH ESTIMATE OFSALESTAXEVASION, 1981*1985
(inl_milllon)
Year TaxPotential ActualTax• EvadedTax
1981 4870 2242 2623
1982 5540 2200 3344
1983 6167 2258 3909
1984 8274 2947 5329
1985 9428 2996 6432
TOTAL 34283 12643 21640
=_Based onNTRCdata.
13,This ratiowas based onthe estimatedshareof BOI outputto totaloutputin Tan
(1979)andon theestimatedshareofsmall,mediumandcottageenterprises inmanufacturing
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Advance Sales Tax and Compensating Tax
The gap approach was utilizedto evaluate the levels of evasion on
advancedsalesandcompensatingtax.Thepotentialtaxbasewasappraised
using the FOB importvalues fromthe NationalCensus and StatisticsOffice
(NCSO). First, imports of petroleum products and alcoholic beverages14
were subtracted from total FOB import values since these goods, being
subjectto excisetax,areexemptfrom the advancesales andcompensating
tax. Second,imports of capital equipment ofBOI-registered firms, imports
on consignment and imports of certain governmentagencies and private
organizations were also deducted from total imports since these are tax-
exempt. The first was estimated based on incentive availment data of the
BOI. The second was obtained from the NIA accounts. The last item was
extrapolated basedon their actual values in 1983and 1984as reported in
Muten (1985). Third,the adjusted FOB import values were transformed to
CIF import values by multiplyingthe former by 1.05, the conversion factor
used.bythe NIA. Fourth,the adjusted CIF import values were multiplied by
one plus the average tariff rate to get the estimates of the landed cost of
importssubjecttoadvance salesandcompensating taxes.TM These represent
the potentialtax baseof advancesalesandcompensating taxes. Twenty
percentof the aggregatepotentialtaxbasewas assumedtobe subjectto
compensatingtax while the remainderwas assumedto be subjectto
advancesalestax based on their relativeshares in 1981-1984 (Muten
1985). The potentialtaxfromcompensating was derivedbymultiplying its
base by .1, the averagecompensatingtax rate.Onthe other hand, the
potential taxfromadvancesaleswasobtainedbymultiplying itstaxbaseby
one plusthe mark-up(on average,this was assumedto be .3 in 1981-
1982and .25 in1983-1985), and bythe averagetax rateof .1.
.Estimates of.evasionlevelsofadvancesalesandcompensatingtaxes
reachedt_26.0 billionin 1981-1985, amounting to 61.2 percentof the tax
potential(Table 10).
License and Business Taxes .
Thetaxelasticitytechniquewasusedto determineincrementallevels
of evasionof licenseand businesstaxes (the aggregateof fixed, sales,
compensation, advancesales,andotherpercentagetaxes). Ofthevarious
equationsestimated,the specification thathadthe best fit is:
14.Importsof alcoholic beverageswere assumed,to account 70 percent of total
beverage imports.




GAPAPPROACH ESTIMATES OFEVASION OF
ADVANCE SALESANDCOMPENSATING TAXES,1981-1985
(Inl_-million)
Year Potential Tax ActualTax• TaxEvaded .
1981 6318 3182 3136
1982 6760 3499 3261
1983 8340 3700 4641
1984 11171 3072 8099
1985 9932 2989 6943
TOTAL 42522 16492 26030
.sBased onNTRCdata.
In LBT =-12.78 + 1.75 In GNP + 16.83 D80 - 1.36 D80 * In GNP
(8.65) (5.85) (-5.80) (6)
Rs = .98 D.W. = 1.57 1975-1986
where the numbers in parenthesis are the t-statistics, LBT is license and
business tax revenue, GNP is gross national product in current prices, D80
is as previously defined.
Additional levels of evasion of license in business taxes are positive for
all years in 1981-1985 but declining in 1982 and 1983 (Table 11).
Table 11
-INCREMENTALLEVELS OF EVASION OF LICENSE
AND BUSINESS TAXES, 1981-1985
(Inl==mllllon)
Year Potential Tax ActualTax" Tax Evaded
1981 7169 7041 578
1982 7447 7297 150
1983 7802 7707 95
1984 8856 8241 615
1985 9271 8712 559
"/ Basedon NTRC data.
Sources of Tax Evasion
We now focus on variables affecting tax evasion levels in order to
present recommendations aimed at minimizing tax evasion.
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Non-filing of Tax Return
A comparisonofthe actualnumber of individualincometax fliersand
the potentialnumberof incometaxtilersrevealsthatoutright non-filingottax
returns is a major source of individual income tax evasion (Table 12). In
1981-1985,only28.9 percent ofpotential taxfliersactually filedtheir return
on the average.
•Table12
POTENTIAL ANDACTUALNUMBER OFINDIVIDUAL INCOMETAXFILERS
1981-1985
Year PotentialNumber' ActualNumber b ComplianceRatio
(%)
1981 8,923,437 2,748,921 30.8
1982 9,061,911 2,574,888 28.4
1983 9,289,441 2,719,337 29.3
1984 9,610,340 2,849,623 29.7
1985 9,024,690 2,389,946 26.5
Average 28.9
_Thepotential number of taxflierswascalculated basedonthe1985FIES
distribution parameters andtheestimated number of households andaggregate
personal income. Ourestimate isunderstated totheextent thatthehousehold is
oftheextended family typeandincludes otherincome earners inaddition tothe
husband and/orwife.
DBIR data
There is also a wide disparity in the numberof actual corporate
taxpayersandinthenumberof activestock corporations registered withthe
Security andExchangeCommission (SEC). In1981-1984,theBIRhasbeen
ableto captureonly38.3 percentof potentialcorporatetax flierson the
average.The resthasbeenabletoeludethetaxnetsuccessfully (Table13).
The problemof non-filingoftax returnand,consequently, of outright
non-reporting ofincomeisanaturalresultofthepresentsystemwhichrelies
on voluntary self-assessmentof taxes. BIR enforcement activitiesare
largely foGusedon audit and investigation of tax returns in their posses-
sion.Amongtaxpayers, therefore, there is a widespread belief that one is
in a better position to make taxes by not filing income tax returns at all.
The problem may be addressed in two ways. First, increasedcomputeri-




Numberof Active" NumberofActualb Compliance
Year SEC-Reglstered CorporateTax Ratio
Corporations Fliers (in%)
1981 75,994 30,192 39.7
1982 79,431 29,228 36.8
1983 83,093 31,790 38.2




taxpayers. For instance, a corporationhas to pay certain fixed and
percentage taxes before it is allowed to operate. With an improved
informationsysteminthe BIR, thesetransactions shouldenablethe BIR
to beef uptheir listof taxpayers.The pointhere is that individualsand
corporations cannottotallyavoidtouchingbase,albeitindirectly,withthe
BIRin anygivenyear;withincreasedcomputerization, the BIRshouldbe
able to constructa masterfileof taxpayersthat has a wider coverage
than what they have at present. With this masterfile,BIR collection
activitiesshouldthen movefromthe morepassivestanceit now takes.
Additionallegislationenablingthe BIR to assess (in contrastto audit)
taxes due mightbe necessary.Second, Muten et al. (1985) has pointed
out that "hijacking" of returns is very much a part of the system.
Hijacking,inthissense,referstothe lossofthe tax returnbeforethe BIR
hasestablishedfirmcontroloverthem.This problemhasbeentracedto
the highlycentralizedproceduresin the BIR (e.g., returnshave to be




and allowabledeductionsin the case of trade/business,professional
incometaxfliers.The NTRC (1986) reporteda widedispersion of ratioof
deduction claimed to gross income indicatingthat overstatement of
deductionsisaprevalentpractice. Consistent withresultsofstudiesinother
countries_ thereissomeevidencethatevasiontendstoincreasewiththe186 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
level of marginal income and by implication with marginal tax rates. Using
group data generated by NTRC (1987) from a sample of business income
• tax returns in 1985, we regressed the ratio of tax deduction claimed to gross
income on gross income levels; we then found a statistically significant
positive relationship between the two variables. An investigation of more
disaggregated data indicated more sectoral variation in the results. In
particular, a positive and significant relationship between deductions to
gross income ratio and gross income levels can be found in all sectors
except electricity,gasand water, wholesale and retailtrade socialcommunity
and personal services (Table 14):
Table 14
RESULTS OF REGRESSIONS OF DEDUCTIONRATIOS TO GROSS INCOME
LEVELS OF•INDIVIDUALBUSINESS INCOME TAX FILERS, 1985"
J
Sector Constant Coefficient T-Statistic R2
TOTAL 76.72 5.65 D-06 7.09 .30
Agriculture 78,15 7.32 D-06 2.59 .40
Mining 75.51 1.64 D-05 3.80 .67
Manufacturing 75.54 8.37 D-06 3.30 .50
Electricity,
gas, & water 72.36 3.59 D-05 1.85 .46
Construction 75.90 6.58 D-06 4.06 .58
Wholesale/retail
trade 76.81 1.20 D-06 .44 .02
Transportation 82.52 4.82 D-06 3.12 .45
Finance 67.10 9.10 D-06 4.23 .62
Services 82.50 2.98 D-06 ° 1.63 .18
NEC 71.85 8.97 D-06 2.94 .46
a_Forbasicdata, see Annex4-B of NTRC (1987).
Our results suggest that expected returns from more intensive tax
audit/investigation are higher in upper income brackets and in the sectors
where significant direct relationshipbetween deduction and income levels
is found.
On the •other hand, regressions using group data generated by the
NTRC from a sample of corporate income tax payers yielded insignificant
results (Table 15). This may bedue tothe fact thatthe corporate incometax
is notprogressive likethe individual incometax with graduated marginaltax
•rates schedule.
For corporations, what is notable is the positive correlation between
the percentage increase in tax after audit and the ratio of deduction claimed
to gross income when sectoral data are used (Table 16). While there is
an element of the chicken and egg paradox in the relationship of deft-MANASAN: TAXEVASION 187
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Table 15
RESULTS OF REGRESSION OF DEDUCTIONRATIOS TO GROSS INCOME
LEVELS OF CORPORATETAX FILERS,1985 •
Sector Constant Coefficient T-Statistic R_
TOTAL 87.82 - 3.15 D-07 - .44 .002
Agriculture 90.32 4.51 D-07 .80 .05
Mining 85.17 - 1,20 D-05 - 1.18 .26
Manufacturing 88.34 - 5.76 D-07 - 1.01 ,08
Electricity,
gas,&water 96.99 - 1.05 D-06 - .92 .30
Construction 87.90 - 1.22 D-07 - .90 .06
Wholesalelretail
trade 89.19 5.04 D-08 .10 .008
Transportation 93.09 2.56 D-07 .52 .02
Services 90.72 1.12 D-07 1.46 .15
NEC 93.96 - 1.24 D-05 - 2.77 .43
=_ Forbasicdata, see Annex4-Aof NTRC (1987).
Table 16
DEFICIENCY TAX AND DEDUCTIONRATIOS FOR CORPORATIONS, 1984"
Ratio of Deficiency Ratio of Deduction














ciency tax rates and reduction ratios, it cannot be denied that deduction
ratio is an important indicator of evasion levels.
In this light, we recommend legislation that will institute statutory limits
on allowable deductions.188 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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Complicated Tax Rules
Muten,et al. (1985) reportedthatBIRofficialsstressedthedifficulty
of administering variousportionsofthe salestaxesdue tothe verymany
rates imposedas well as the tax credit systemused. It is a well known
rulein publicadministration thatmorecomplicatedrulesare moredifficult
to enforcethansimplerones.The recentlysignedExecutiveOrderonthe
value addedtax (VAT) willsimplifythe salestax systemby reducingthe
numberofratesfromfivetotwo.Thepresentsystemwhichhasa verywide
coveragedissipitates thetaxcollection efforts.The newEO,byallowing for
the exemptionofenterpriseswithgrosssalesbelowt_200,000perannum
shouldhelpthe BIR in givingtheirwork sharperfocus.However, experi-
encesin othercountriesshowthatadequatecomputersupportis essent-
ial in the successfuloperationalization of a value added systemparticu-
larly in the area of invoice matching.Futhermore,the experienceof
South Korea and Taiwan which had encouragingsuccess in VAT
implementation suggeststhe importanceof adequate lead-intime spent
in extensiveinformationcampaigns.The Philippines'lack in this regard
mightexplainthe generalconfusion that accompaniedthe introduction of
VAT and the poorrevenueshowingof VAT inthe countryin itsfirstyear.
Bank Secrecy Act
It has been pointedout elsewhere (Muten, et al., 1985, Paz and
Pitargue1986)thatRA1405whichprohibits disclosure ofbankaccountsis
amajorimpediment intheinvestigation oftaxevasion cases.Anamendment
ofthislaw,istherefore,inorder.
Penalties
The _heoreticalliterature suggests that high penalty rate and high
probabilityofdetection are majordeterrentstotax evasion.Theprevalence
and the magnitudeof tax evasionin the country suggestthat existing
penaltiesand the likelihoodof beingcaughtand punishedare nothigh
enoughto discourageevasion.Thiscallsfor,first,a reviewofthe present
penaltyprovisions whichhadbeendescribedby Muten,et a/. (1985) as a
"lowmaximum finebeingmerelyaslaponthewristand/oraprisonsentence
that isinvirtuallyallcasesregardedastooharshevertobe imposed,"and,
second,highervisibility oftheBIR'senforcement activity SO asto,instill some
fear in the heartsof taxpayers.The publicationof taxpayers and BIR
personnelpenalizedin relationto tax evasioncases shouldhelp in this
regard.MANASAN:TAX EVASION 189
Corruption in BIR
Corruption inthe BIR,or at least,thepublic'sperception thatthereis
corruptioninthe BIR,wouldtendtoerodetaxcompliance behavioramong
taxpayerby reducing the fearof sanctions. Anecdotesofcorruptioninthe
BIR aremanybutBriones'(1979) isone ofthe fewthatdocumentssuch
negativebureaucratic behaviorinthe agency.She assertedthatlegaland
administrative sanctions arenotenoughtocontrolthispracticebecausethe
administrativecultureinthe BIR encouragesit. The solutionlies in the
reeducation oftheBIRpersonnel, higherwagesfor BIRemployees, leadership
by example,andthe reductionofopportunities forgraftand corruption by
reducingthe discretionary authorityofBIR agents.190 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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